There is nothing really new in Michael Fellman’s monograph In the Name of God and Country: Reconsidering Terrorism in American History (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2010). But then there doesn’t have to be. It is an excellent and much needed work of historical, sociological, social psychological, and historical synthesis on the history of terrorism in the United States.
Everything in Fellman's book, as I said, scholars have known for some time. Practitioners of the social sciences and the humanities, for instance, have long recognised that humans can be nasty and brutish bullies, rapists, pillagers, burners of villagers, cleansers of others, and even genociders of themselves. They have long known that history is filled to the brim with examples of each of these, too many, in fact, to note and so many that it boggles the mind to realise that there remain Enlightenment progressivists out there who still harbour dreams of a radiant utopian future. The depth and breadth of what some might call human depravity has increased thanks to technological inventions like the cannon, the machine gun, and the atomic bomb. These marvellous technological innovations, when allied with bureaucratic efficiency, for instance, gave us the Holocaust (an event which convinced me once and for all about the fallen nature of human beings), and have given us several more holocausts since including the one in progress (pun intended) as I type. So much for the hollow rhetoric of never again.
Practitioners of the social sciences and the humanities have long known that in order for humans and human groups to create identities they have to mark themselves off against other humans and other human groups. By doing so they created and they create an identity for themselves. They create, thanks to this process, an us. The human identity groups in which humans have been embedded from the very beginning of their existence have taken various forms across time and space. They have taken the form of, for example, clans, bands, tribes, cliques, social and cultural movements, extended families of blood, and chiefdoms or monarchical states and nation-states.
Practitioners of the social sciences and humanities have long recognised that meanings are at the heart of human groups and human identity construction, and that consequently culture is at the heart of human groups and group identity construction. They have long recognised that these human groups often if not generally classify their culture as sacred and the culture of them, of the other as profane (evil, despicable, weird, inferior). In the process, these meanings provide specific humans in specific human group with a sense of who they are and a notion of purpose not only within the group but in relation to other groups and in relation to their broader environments. It gives many if not all of these groups a sense of specialness, a sense of chosenness, and a sense of mission.
Practitioners of the social sciences and humanities have long known that human groups are dynamic. Max Weber, for instance, noticed that groups had within themselves the possibility if not inevitability of conflict, whether hot or cold. Human groups, particularly those in larger and more complex societies, are characterised by cultism, the process that occurs when a social and cultural movement such as Christianity throws off, at least rhetorically, the garments of its past, in the case of Christianity its Pharisaic Jewish origins, instituting, in the process, a new movement that develops its own organisational form, new wine in old wineskins. These new social and cultural movements are initially, as Weber notes, generally led by charismatic figures to whom followers ascribe authority and special power. I give you Jesus, Muhammed, Baha’u'llah, Joseph Smith, Jim and Tammy Baker, Huey Long, Milton Friedman, etc., etc., etc. These charismatic figures don’t, as this list makes clear, have to be what we call religious figures. They can be politicians, economists, salesmen and women, and so on and so forth. These new movements, in turn, thanks to organisational fossilisation, are invariably sectarian as some in the movements feel that something was lost in the transition from charismatic to traditional and bureaucratic forms of organisation and authority.
Fellman’s book brings this social scientific and humanities wisdom on identity construction, the manufacture of the other, charismatic figures, and social and cultural movements together in order to explore five case studies which foreground the history of the role revolutionary terrorism and reactionary terrorism, including state sponsored or state enforced reactionary terrorism, in American history. Fellman begins his epic tale of the history of terrorism in the United States with John Brown who used revolutionary violence to try to end slavery in the 1850s and was met, as Felllman notes, by the reactionary terror of the state of Virginia which brutally put down Brown’s attempted revolution. He also notes that this same state reactionary terrorism inadvertently gave Brown a platform which he used to turn himself into a Christ-like martyr of a holy cause at his trial, something that, as Fellman notes, was a major factor leading the US into civil war with itself.
In subsequent chapters Fellman deals with other forms of revolutionary and reactionary terrorism. The next chapter of the book explores the revolutionary terror of the Civil War in Missouri and Kansas and the US and Confederate response (reactionary terror) to that revolutionary terrorism. Next Fellman explores the reactionary terror brought against Blacks and White Republican scallywags and carpetbaggers in the post-Civil War South, a terror that, for Blacks, lasted from the end of the Civil War into the 1970s and some might argue beyond. Fellman follows this chapter with a chapter on the revolutionary terrorism of workers and ideological radicals in Chicago in the late nineteenth century, a revolutionary terrorism, that we who have been closely reading Fellman’s book should know by now, was met by even stronger state reactionary terrorism and the terrorism of the masses, a form of reactionary violence and terrorism one might want to distinguish from state reactionary violence and terror at least for analytical purposes though clearly they are related given the role the state plays in socialisation for fear. Fellman closes the case studies chapters of his book with an analysis of the twentieth century American imperial adventure in the Philippines, the revolutionary terrorism of those trying to evict the American invader, and the terrorism of torture, the killing of non-combatants and surrendering combatants, and mutilation unleashed by American soldiers in the Philippines with the tacit approval of its military and political leaders. If all of this seems like deja vu for many of us today it should for as Fellman notes when talking about the reactionary terror unleashed by the Bush the Second administration on global revolutionary terrorism in the early 21st century.
So what, asks Fellman, can we learn from these case studies of revolutionary and reactionary terrorism? Beyond the fact that earlier forms of revolutionary and reactionary terror influence later ones, Fellman argues that history shows again and again that there has been a cycle of revolutionary terrorism met by reactionary terrorism and, I would add, reactionary terrorism met by revolutionary terrorism at least since the advent of the modern world. Whether this cycle will continue within modern and postmodern societies given the use of sophisticated surveillance technologies by the state is a question worth asking. I would argue that given the increasing power of the state and its elite allies, the increasing socialisation power of the state, the use the powers that be make of new digital bread and circus technologies, and the surveillance power of the state there may be diminishing opportunities for revolutionary terrorism as a reaction to state terrorism. As for cycles of revolutionary terror and reactionary terror and reactionary terror and revolutionary terror outside of core nations and between core nations and peripheral societies, I suspect those will continue for some time.
Fellman’s In the Name of God and Country does an excellent job of exploring this cycle of terrorism that has impacted a world of radical ideologies, religious ideologies, state centralisation, state power, and class and racial inequalities. He does an excellent job of exploring the religious and religious like bedrock of both revolutionary and reactionary terrorism. He does a nice job, in a chapter on defining terrorism, of exploring the difficulties associated historically with how to define “terrorism". Everyone interested in the social sciences and humanities should read this book, a book that shows that when it comes to the use of terror the US is not exceptional in any way, shaper, or form. It nicely shows that like the imperial powers of yore the US has had no trouble sweeping its ideology of political, economic, and cultural exceptionalism under the rug and its ideologies of freedom of speech and devotion to liberty and freedom under the rug when necessary, something that has often been necessary in dealing with First Peoples and cultural and ideological dissidents, native or not, for instance. In the end Fellman’s book convinced me even more of two things, first, that with humans, while capable of “good” are also simultaneously capable of “evil” and, second, that American exceptionalism is exceptionally fictional just like it is in every other nation-state across time and over space that believes that it is exceptional. But then humans do like their myths.